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PROTESTORS HAVE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS,
TOO: IN GRAVES V. CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, THE
NINTH CIRCUIT CLOUDS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
LAW GOVERNING SEARCHES
Holly Vance
Abstract: In Graves v. City of Coeur d'Alene, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit concluded that a police officer should not have arrested a protestor at an Aryan
Nations parade when the protestor refused to allow the officer to search his backpack. The
court held that the arrest was illegal because the officer had no probable cause to believe the
protestor was carrying a weapon. However, the court also held that the arresting officer was
entitled to qualified immunity and thus not liable for his violation of the protestor's rights.
Qualified immunity is a privilege that shields a public official from liability in situations
where the underlying substantive law is not clearly established. In Graves, the court held that
under the circumstances surrounding the Aryan Nations parade, the standard for probable
cause to search the protestor's backpack was not clearly established. This Note argues that
the police officer in Graves searched the protestor without sufficient individualized
suspicion. Instead, as a basis for the search the officer relied on a broad profile of otherwise
ordinary conduct that would include a number of innocent individuals. Because the law was
clearly established at the time of the search that police officers must have some
individualized suspicion of a person to perform a search, and that individualized suspicion
cannot be based on ordinary conduct that would include a number of innocent people, the
defendant police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity.

In light of recent terrorist attacks, police officers have the critical task
of maintaining public safety while protecting constitutionally guaranteed
civil rights. The attacks of September 11, 2001, the Oklahoma City
bombing, and the bombing at the Atlanta Olympics have caused widespread fear of terrorism.' At the same time, police officers have
responded with increased vigilance.2 However, there is a risk that
increased security measures are at odds with this nation's history of
upholding civil liberties.

1. See William Drozdiak, FBI Probes Bombing as Olympic Games Continue, WASH. POST, July
28, 1996, at Al; Pierre Thomas & George Lardner Jr., Oklahoma Bomb Suspects Indicted, CHI.
SuN-TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at 3, 1995 WL 6665930.
2. See OFFICE OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 15-16

(2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/homelandibook/nat-strat-hls.pdf.
3. See Philip Shenon, Report on U.S. Antiterrorism Law Alleges Violations of Civil Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2003, at Al.
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One of those liberties is the right to be free of unreasonable searches.4
That right is protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which prohibits police from searching people's possessions
unless there is probable cause to believe that the possessions contain
"contraband or evidence of a crime." 5 To establish probable cause,
police officers must have individualized suspicion of a particular
person.6 Individualized suspicion cannot be based on a broad profile of
otherwise ordinary
conduct that would include a number of innocent
7
individuals.

The opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Graves v. City of Coeur d'Alene 8 illustrates the conflict between security
concerns and Fourth Amendment rights. In Graves, a Coeur d'Alene
police officer arrested a protestor at an Aryan Nations parade for
obstructing the officer by refusing to allow the officer to search his
bulky backpack. 9 The Graves court held that the arrest was unlawful
because the officer lacked probable cause for the search, and the
protestor was within his rights to refuse the search.' 0 However, the court
also concluded that the arresting officer was entitled to qualified
immunity because the standard for probable cause for the search of a
person's backpack on a public street during a demonstration had not
been clearly established."
This Note argues that the Graves court improperly granted the officer
qualified immunity from civil liability because the probable cause
standard governing the search of the demonstrator's backpack was
clearly established. Part I of this Note outlines U.S. Supreme Court and
Ninth Circuit precedent that guide police officers' determinations of
probable cause and reasonable suspicion for searches and seizures. Part
II reviews the doctrine of qualified immunity and examines the "clearly
established" standard. Part III outlines the facts, procedural history,
holding, and rationale of the Graves decision. Part IV argues that the
Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the officer in the Graves case was
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

5. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
6. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
7. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592,

595-96 (9th Cir. 1992).
8. 339 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2003).
9. Id. at 836-37.
10. Id.at 844.
11. Id. at 847-48.
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entitled to qualified immunity because in making a probable cause
determination, the officer relied on a broad profile of ordinary conduct
that would implicate many innocent individuals, and clearly established
law prohibited the use of such a broad profile as a basis for
individualized suspicion in support of probable cause.
I.

POLICE MUST HAVE INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION FOR
SEARCH OR SEIZURE OF A PARTICULAR SUSPECT

The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to 'be12
secure in their... effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. 13
Police officers must have probable cause to search a person's effects.
Brief investigative stops (Terry stops) require reasonable suspicion-a
lower level of suspicion than probable cause.' 4 To establish probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, officers must have "individualized
suspicion" that a person has broken the law, is breaking the law, or is
about to break the law. 5 Officers cannot show individualized suspicion
through the use of a broad profile consisting of otherwise ordinary16
conduct that would implicate a number of innocent individuals.
Exceptions to the Court's requirement for individualized suspicion are
limited to special needs programs and certain administrative searches. 17
A.

IndividualizedSuspicion Is a Necessary Component of Probable
Cause and Reasonable Suspicion Determinations

The Fourth Amendment prohibits police from conducting
unreasonable searches or seizures.' 8 A search occurs when police invade
an area, or look through a possession, in which someone has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, 19 while a seizure occurs when a
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981).
14. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).
15. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (holding that individualized
suspicion is necessary for a search or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment except
for limited situations involving special needs and administrative searches); Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305, 308, 313 (1997) (same).
16. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592,
595-96 (9th Cir. 1992).
17. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
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person is restrained from moving by the use of physical force or
submission to authority.20 Seizures include arrests and Terry stops. 2I

Police officers must have probable cause to conduct a legal search 22 or
arrest. 23 To lawfully conduct a Terry stop, officers must have reasonable

suspicion, which is a lower predicate than probable cause.24
An unreasonable search is a search based on less than probable
cause. 25 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that probable cause for a
search exists when "there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. 2 6 The Court has
further defined probable cause as "'less than evidence which would
28
27
justify condemnation' or conviction,, but more than "bare suspicion.,
A Terry stop is unreasonable when it is grounded on less than reasonable
suspicion. 29 The reasonable suspicion standard is satisfied when30 police
officers reasonably believe "that criminal activity may be afoot."
To conduct a lawful search or Terry stop, police officers must base
their determination of probable cause or reasonable suspicion on
individualized suspicion about a particular suspect. 31 In making a
determination of individualized suspicion for a search or Terry stop, the
issue "isnot whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the
degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal
acts. 32 In Ybarra v. Illinois,33 the U.S. Supreme Court considered
whether officers had probable cause to search Ventura Ybarra when,
acting under a warrant that did not include Ybarra, the officers searched
a tavern where he was a patron.34 Officers obtained the warrant based on
20. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).
21. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968).

22. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
23. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,499 (1983).
24. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
25. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981).

26. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
27. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813)).

28. Id.
29. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7; Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
30. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
31. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52-53
(1979).

32. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-44 (1983)).
33. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
34. Id. at 88.
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a tip from an informant who reported seeing heroin packets in the
possession of the bartender and having the heroin offered for sale to him
by the bartender. 35 During the search of the tavern, officers frisked
Ybarra and removed a cigarette packet that was later found to contain
heroin.36 The Court held that there was no probable cause for the
officers' search of Ybarra because they did not have any basis for
individualized suspicion of him. 37 Similarly, in Terry v. Ohio,38 the
Court held that a brief investigative stop is permissible only when
officers have a reasonable suspicion based on facts 39particular to the
individual that a person is engaged in criminal activity.
Although police officers may consider the surrounding circumstances
in their analysis of probable cause or reasonable suspicion,
individualized suspicion of a particular suspect is always necessary for a
search or Terry stop. 4 ° For example, in Ybarra, the Court held that
regardless of the suspicious circumstances at the tavern, including
known drug trafficking by the bartender and some of the patrons,
officers did not have probable cause to perform a search when they had
no individualized suspicion of Ybarra. 4 1 Likewise, in Brown v. Texas,42
the Court held that officers could not base reasonable suspicion entirely
on the surrounding circumstances in the context of a Terry stop. 43 In
Brown, police officers stopped Zackary Brown after observing him
walking away from another man in an alley that was frequently used for
drug trafficking and demanded that he identify himself.44 The Court
concluded that Brown's stop was not lawful under the Terry standard
because officers did not base their determination of reasonable suspicion
on any facts that were particular to Brown.4 5

35. Id. at 87-88.
36. Id. at 88-89.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 90-92.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See id. at 21.
See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 90-91; Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1979).
See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 90-91.
443 U.S. 47 (1979).
Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 52.
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IndividualizedSuspicion Cannot Be Based on CharacteristicsThat
Would Implicate a Number of Innocent Individuals

In the context of a Terry stop, police officers may not base their
determination of individualized suspicion of a person on broad profiles
of otherwise ordinary conduct that would implicate a number of innocent
individuals.46 In Reid v. Georgia,47 the U.S. Supreme Court held that an
officer from the Drug Enforcement Administration impermissibly
stopped the defendant without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.4 8
The officer based the stop on the following factors, which he believed fit
a typical "drug courier profile": 49 (1) the defendant had traveled from a
city frequently implicated in drug trafficking; (2) he arrived early in the
morning; (3) the defendant and his companion did not check any
luggage; and (4) the defendant and his companion appeared to be trying
to hide the fact they were traveling together. 50 The Court reasoned that
only the last of these factors related to the particular conduct of the
defendant. 51 It concluded that "[t]he other circumstances describe a very
large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject
to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude that as little
foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure. ' ' 2 While the
Court concluded that the fourth factor did cast some suspicion on the
defendant, it determined that the defendant's conduct in relation to his
53
traveling companion was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.
The Reid Court therefore held that the officer did not have sufficient
54
individualized suspicion of the defendant to support a Terry stop.
In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit also concluded that officers cannot
ground individualized suspicion on ordinary behavior that would include
many innocent individuals.5 5 In United States v. Rodriguez,5 6 border
46. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592,
595-96 (9th Cir. 1992). There is no case law applying this principle to the probable cause standard
for searches.
47. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
48. Seeid. at 441.
49. Id.at 440-41.
50. Id.
51. Seeid. at 441.
52. Id.
53. See id.

54. See id.
55. See United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1992).
56. 976 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1992).
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control agents stopped Ramiro Rodriguez after observing him driving
alone down the highway.57 When the agents decided to perform a Terry
stop of Rodriguez, they relied on the following factors: (1) the road he
was driving on was a "notorious route for alien smugglers"; (2) he did
not acknowledge the agents as they drove by in a marked vehicle; (3) he
was driving a car the agents believed could be used for alien smuggling;
(4) he looked at the agents in the rearview mirror several times; (5) the
car appeared to be "heavily loaded"; and (6) Rodriguez was a Hispanic
male. 58 The Rodriguez court held that these factors did not provide
sufficient individualized suspicion of Rodriguez to justify his stop
because each factor was otherwise normal behavior, and even taken
together, the factors would ensnare a number of innocent people. 59 It
concluded that the court "must not accept what has come to appear to be
a prefabricated or recycled profile of suspicious behavior very likely to
sweep many ordinary citizens into a generality of suspicious appearance
merely on hunch. 6 °
While police officers cannot base individualized suspicion wholly on
otherwise ordinary conduct that would include a number of law-abiding
individuals, otherwise innocent factors, when grouped together, can
sometimes amount to reasonable suspicion.61 In United States v.
Sokolow,62 the U.S. Supreme Court held that officers had reasonable
suspicion to stop a traveler at an airport when he: (1) paid $2100 in cash
for two airline tickets from a roll of twenty-dollar bills; (2) traveled
under an alias; (3) listed his original destination as Miami, a city known
as a source of illegal drugs; (4) stayed in Miami for only forty-eight
hours even though his round-trip flight took twenty hours; (5) appeared
nervous; and (6) checked no luggage.63 The Court held that although
none of these factors individually would have established reasonable
64
suspicion, taken together, they amounted to reasonable suspicion.
Thus, ordinary behavior, when examined by police as a whole, may
amount to individualized suspicion. 65 However, officers may not base
57. Id.at593.
58. Id.at594-95.
59. See id. at 595-96.
60. Id.
61. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989).
62. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
at3,9-10.
63. See id.
at9-10.
64. Id.
65. See id
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individualized suspicion on a profile
of ordinary conduct that would
66
implicate many innocent individuals.
C.

Officers May Only Conduct a Search Unsupportedby
IndividualizedSuspicion as Partof a Special Needs Program or
Administrative Search

Police officers may only conduct a search without individualized
suspicion of a crime in limited circumstances. 67 The U.S. Supreme Court
has upheld searches ungrounded in individualized suspicion only in
cases where the searches were part of an organized special needs
program or a specific administrative search. 68 A special needs program
must be based on standardized criteria and cannot be founded on
evidence or suspicion of criminal conduct. 69 Constitutionally permissible
70
special needs programs include random drug testing of student athletes,
drug and alcohol testing of certain railway employees, 71 and road
checkpoints to detect intoxicated drivers and illegal aliens.72 Examples
of allowable suspicionless administrative searches include inspections of
a "closely regulated" junkyard business to uncover evidence of
car
74
theft73 and inspections of buildings to determine the cause of a fire.
Special needs programs are constitutional only if the searches are
aimed at addressing a valid state objective and are based on special
needs, beyond those of normal law enforcement. 75 For example, in
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 76 the Court held that a
random highway checkpoint, for alcohol intoxication was not
unreasonable because the state had a valid interest, beyond the normal
needs of law enforcement, in preventing drunk driving.7 7 However, the
66. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592,
595-96 (9th Cir. 1992).
67. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,37 (2000).
68. Id.

69. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1990).
70. Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995).
71. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989).
72. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32.
73. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712 (1987).
74. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
75. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1997); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 450-51 (1990).
76. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
77. See id.
at 455.
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Court reached the opposite conclusion in City of Indianapolis v.
-Edmond,78 when it held that random road checkpoints for illegal drugs
were unconstitutional. 79 The Court reasoned that because the purpose of
the Edmond checkpoints was almost indistinguishable from general
crime prevention, allowing such searches would have effectively
circumvented the Court's requirement for individualized suspicion for
searches related to general crime prevention. 0
In sum, when making a determination of probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, police officers may consider the circumstances surrounding81
the situation in addition to the factors particular to the suspect.
However, officers must have some individualized suspicion of a person
to establish probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 2 Individualized
suspicion cannot be based on a profile consisting of otherwise ordinary
83
conduct that is likely to implicate a number of innocent individuals.
Absent individualized suspicion, officers may only conduct a search or
seizure as part of a special needs program that advances a valid state
law enforcement or in
objective extending beyond the goals of normal
84
search.
administrative
valid
a
conjunction with
II.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY PROTECTS PUBLIC OFFICIALS
FROM CIVIL LIABILITY IN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES

Qualified immunity allows public officials to avoid liability for
violating a person's civil liberties.8 5 The doctrine protects officials from
liability in situations where the law was not clear at the time of the
violation, 6 thus ensuring "that before they are subjected to suit, officers
are on notice their conduct is unlawful. 8 7 The U.S. Supreme Court
established the doctrine of qualified immunity as a means of balancing
78. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
79. See id at 48.
80. See id at 44.
81. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52-53
(1979).
82. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37; Chandler v.Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997).
83. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592,
595-96 (9th Cir. 1992).
84. See Chandler,520 U.S. at 313-14; Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450-51
(1990).
85. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,526 (1985).
86. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-40 (2002).
87. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001).
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the rights of citizens against the public interest in allowing public
officials to function effectively.8 8
In Saucier v. Katz,89 the Court announced a two-part test for
determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity. 90 First,
a plaintiff must establish that an official violated one of the plaintiffs
constitutional rights. 9' When considering whether plaintiffs rights have
been violated, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.92 The court then considers whether the right was "clearly
established" at the time it was violated. 93 A right is clearly established if
it would be objectively clear to a reasonable official that the official's
conduct was unlawful.94
When evaluating whether a right is clearly established, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that courts should look at precedent applying
the legal rule in a similar factual situation. 95 However, the test is whether
case law makes a right "apparent," not whether "the very action in
question has previously been held unlawful. 9 6 For example, in Mendoza
v.Block,97 police officers used a dog to track a robbery suspect. 98 The
suspect claimed that the officers' use of the dog was an excessive use of
force, but the officers raised a qualified immunity defense. 99 The
question before the Ninth Circuit was whether the law regarding use of a
police dog was clearly established. 0 0 The officers claimed that it was
not, because there were few cases dealing with the issue of dogs.' 0 The
Mendoza court disagreed, finding that a number of cases had clearly
established the law regarding use of force in general, 0 2 and that a

88.
89.
90.
91.

See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
533 U.S. 194 (2001).
See id at 201.
See id.;
see also Hope, 536 U.S. at 736.
92. See Katz, 533 U.S. at 201.
93. Id.
94. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
27 F.3d 1357 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1358-59.
Id. at 1359.

100. See id at 1360-61.
101. See id. at 1361. The officers claimed there was no case law that addressed the use of police
dogs, although the Mendoza court noted that there were other decisions that discussed this issue. Id.
102. See id.
at 1361-62.
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reasonable police officer would have known that those cases applied to
any use of force, whether through "use of a baton, use of a gun, or use of
a dog." 10 3 Thus, to clearly establish
a legal principle, case law need not
14
consider every factual scenario.'
III.

IN GRA VES THE NINTH CIRCUIT HELD THAT A POLICE
OFFICER WAS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

In Graves v. City of Coeur d'Alene, the Ninth Circuit considered
whether a police officer violated the civil liberties of a protestor at an
Aryan Nations parade by arresting him when he refused to consent to a
search of his backpack.' 0 5 The court held that the officer did not have
10 6
probable cause to search the backpack and the arrest was unlawful.
However, the court concluded that the officer was entitled to qualified
immunity from civil liability because the law had not been clearly
established regarding the degree of weight that the officer could assign
to the surrounding circumstances
of the parade when making his
07
cause.1
probable
of
determination
A.

The Jury Found That Officer Dixon DidNot Violate Crowell's
Civil Rights

The dispute in Graves arose from events occurring at an Aryan
Nations parade in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, in 1998.108 Local police
expected that several groups, including the Jewish Defense League,
would protest the parade. 0 9 The police were worried about the potential
for violence at the parade, given the reputations of both the Aryan
Nations and the Jewish Defense League, and the fact that the president
of the Jewish Defense League had announced that Coeur d'Alene's
streets would "run red with blood."11 0 Adding to the tension surrounding
the parade was a report that someone had stolen ammonium nitrate, a
chemical used in construction blasting, from a construction site
103. Id. at 1362.
104. See id.

105. Graves v. City ofCoeur d'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 840 (9th Cir. 2003).
106. See id. at 845.
107. Id. at 847-48.
108. Id. at 834-37.
109. Id. at 834.
110. Id. (internal quotations omitted).

763

Washington Law Review

Vol. 79:753, 2004

approximately 300 miles from the city." 1 Because of their concerns
about violence, police officers were searching the bags of many of the
people protesting the march. 1 2 One of the plaintiffs in Graves, Jonathan
Crowell, attended the parade to voice his opposition to the Aryan
Nations. 1 3 Crowell walked along the parade route wearing a heavy14
'
backpack and carrying a sign that read, "Earth first, hatred last." "
Officer Dixon, a member of the Coeur d'Alene Police Department,
demanded that he be allowed to search Crowell's backpack.' 1 5 Crowell
refused, stating that it was his constitutional right not to consent to a
search. 1 6 Officer Dixon then demanded to search the backpack, but
Crowell continued to refuse to consent to the search. 1 7 Finally, Officer
Dixon arrested Crowell for obstructing a police officer. 1 8 The one other
protestor who refused to allow the officer to search his bag was also
arrested. 1 9 After Crowell's arrest, Officer Dixon searched Crowell's
backpack and discovered jars of peanut butter, jelly, and applesauce, in
addition to bread, shoes, and clothes. 120 In 1999, Crowell sued Officer
Dixon in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho for false arrest
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.21 At the trial, Officer Dixon testified that while
Crowell had definitely asserted that the search violated his civil rights,
he had not verbally or physically assaulted the officer. 122 Officer Dixon
also testified that he suspected Crowell's backpack contained explosives
111. Id.

112. Brief for Appellant at 2-3, Graves (No. 02-35119).
113. Graves, 339 F.3d at 834.
114. Id.at 835.
115. Id. at 836.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 837. Officer Dixon called his supervisor, Lieutenant Hotchkiss, by radio before
arresting Crowell. Lieutenant Surplus overheard the call and replied, "[I]f he won't let us look in the
pack, [you] need[ ] to arrest him." Id.(internal quotations omitted).
119. Brief for Appellant at 3, Graves (No. 02-35119).
120. Graves, 339 F.3d at 837. On April 14-15, 1999, Crowell was prosecuted for obstructing a
police officer pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-705, which defines obstruction of an officer as conduct
that .'resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer, in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any
duty of his office."' Id.at 833, 840 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 18-705). The trial resulted in a hung
jury. Id. at 833. As ofJune 1, 2001, Crowell was awaiting retrial. Id. at 833 n.l.
121. Id. at 833. Five protestors, Jonathan Crowell, Gary Bizek, Lori Graves, Jeffrey Kerns, and
Kenneth Malone, were originally plaintiffs in the case. Id. at 833 n.2. All claims except those made
by Crowell and Bizek were dismissed on partial summary judgment. Id.Crowell also named Officer
Surplus as a defendant on a theory of supervisory liability. Id.
122. Id.at 836-37.

Fourth Amendment Rights of Protestors
because it was "heavy" and looked like it contained "round cylindrical
type objects."' 123 However, he also admitted to searching the bags of
approximately fourteen other protestors that day and could not
remember targeting the bags of these protestors for any particular
reason, such as being large or bulky. 124 Crowell alleged that the practice
of police officers on the day of the parade was to search the bags of
anyone who appeared to be demonstrating against the parade, and that
there was no indication that police searched any of the non-protestors,
such as members of the media. 125 Crowell also demonstrated at trial that
a backpack identical to the one he wore on the day of1 26the march,
containing the same items, did not have any unusual bulges.
The jury returned a verdict for Officer Dixon, finding that he had not
falsely arrested Crowell. 127 Crowell appealed to the Ninth Circuit on the
grounds that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 128 Crowell argued that he had not
obstructed a police officer by refusing to consent to a search of his
backpack because Officer Dixon did not have probable cause to search
the backpack.129 Officer
Dixon did not raise the defense of qualified
130
immunity on appeal.

123. Id. at 836 (internal quotations omitted).
124. Brief for Appellant at 11, Graves (No. 02-35119).
125. Id.at 2-3.
126. Id. at 11.
127. Graves, 339 F.3d at 837. The protestors then filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 and, in the alternative, moved for a new trial
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Id. at 837-38. The district court denied both motions. Id.
128. Id. at 833. Graves presents a unique situation in that it involves a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in a case where the court subsequently raised the issue of qualified
immunity sua sponte. Id. at 846 n.23. When making a determination of qualified immunity, the
court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201 (2001). However, when evaluating a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, the court must look at the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, which
in this case is the defendant. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1); Graves, 339 F.3d at 846 n.24.
129. Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Graves (No. 02-35119).
130. Graves, 339 F.3d at 845 n.23.
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The Ninth CircuitConcluded That Officer Dixon DidNot Have
ProbableCause To Search Crowell's Backpack

In Graves, the Ninth Circuit held that even in light of the hostile
circumstances surrounding the Aryan Nations parade,1 31 Officer Dixon
did not have adequate individualized suspicion of Crowell to give him
probable cause to search Crowell's backpack. 132 The Graves court
concluded that the fact that Crowell's backpack appeared to be heavy
and bulging did not give Officer Dixon "substantial" individualized
suspicion about Crowell because many innocent objects can make a
backpack look heavy and bulging.' 33 The court acknowledged that
Officer Dixon had good intentions, 134
but noted that "a good motive is not
cause.,
probable
show
to
sufficient
C.

The Ninth CircuitHeld That Officer Dixon Was Entitled to
Qualified Immunity Because the Law ConcerningProbableCause
Determinations Was Not Clearly Established

The Ninth Circuit held that Officer Dixon was not liable for violating
Crowell's Fourth Amendment civil liberties because he was entitled to
qualified immunity.' 35 The court raised the issue of qualified immunity
sua sponte. 136 The Graves court reasoned that Officer Dixon was entitled
to qualified immunity because the law had not clearly established how
much weight Officer Dixon could give to the surrounding circumstances
when he was deciding whether he had probable cause to search
Crowell's backpack. 137 The court concluded that "a reasonable
131. Id. at 841-42. Factors relating to the circumstances surrounding the parade included: (1) the
"hostile" circumstances surrounding the parade; (2) the Aryan Nations' violent history; (3) the
Jewish Defense League president's threat; (4) the fact that cylindrical objects can contain
explosives; (5) the fact that the 1996 Olympic Park bomber hid his bomb in a backpack; and (6) the
fact that police were notified that explosives had been stolen from a construction site in
southwestern Idaho. Id. at 842.
132. Id. at 844. Although the backpack's appearance failed to support Officer Dixon's probable
cause determination, the Graves court noted that its appearance would have supported a Terry stop
of Crowell. Id. at 843.
133. Id. at 844. Factors relating to Crowell specifically included the fact that: (1) Crowell was
loud; (2) Crowell did not consent to the search; (3) Crowell did not give his name when Officer
Dixon asked for it; and (4) Crowell's backpack was heavy and contained cylindrical objects. Id. at
841-42.
134. Id. at 844.
135. Id. at 847-48.
136. Id. at 846 n.23.
137. Id. at 847-48.
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officer... could have believed that [the circumstances surrounding the
parade] carried enough weight to create probable cause when there was
at least some individualized suspicion."' 3 8 The court considered
Crowell's backpack to be sufficiently suspicious to make Officer
Dixon's probable
cause determination reasonable under the
39
circumstances.

IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
OFFICER WAS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In Graves, Officer Dixon determined that there was probable cause to
search Crowell's backpack based on the fact that he was a protestor
carrying a heavy backpack. 140 Carrying a heavy backpack at a protest
march is ordinary behavior and cannot serve as the basis for
individualized suspicion. Because a reasonable police officer would
have known that probable cause requires individualized suspicion 14 1 that
cannot be based on ordinary behavior that would implicate many
innocent people142-such as carrying a heavy backpack-Officer Dixon
was not entitled to qualified immunity. If the Coeur d'Alene Police
Department believed that searching the bags of people attending the
Aryan Nations parade was necessary to ensure safety, the Department
should have performed searches as part of an organized special needs
program.
A.

IndividualizedSuspicion of Crowell CouldNot Be Based on His
Backpack Because Carryinga Heavy Backpack Is Ordinary
Behavior at a ProtestMarch

The Graves court held that Officer Dixon had sufficient reasonable
suspicion of Crowell to perform a lawful Terry stop based on the hostile
circumstances of the parade and Crowell's heavy backpack, 143 but that
Officer Dixon did not have probable cause to search Crowell's

138. Id. at 847.
139. Id. at 847-48.
140. Id. at 836.
141. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997).
142. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592,
595-96 (9th Cir. 1992).
143. See Graves, 339 F.3d at 843.
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backpack. 144 The court erred in concluding that Officer Dixon had
enough reasonable suspicion to stop Crowell because it relied too
heavily on the surrounding circumstances of the parade and placed
insufficient emphasis on Officer Dixon's lack of individualized
suspicion of Crowell. Police officers may consider the surrounding
circumstances in addition to the individualized suspicion of a particular
person when making an assessment of reasonable suspicion or probable
cause. 145 However, individualized suspicion is always necessary for
police officers to conduct a lawful Terry stop or a search under the
Fourth Amendment. 46 In Graves, the surrounding circumstances of the
parade, which included the presence of two organizations known for
violence and the report of stolen explosives,1 47 were hostile, and thus
weighed in favor of the Ninth Circuit's determination that there was
enough reasonable suspicion to stop Crowell. Regardless of these
circumstances police officers did not have enough individualized
suspicion of Crowell to set him apart from the other parade attendees
and allow officers to conduct a lawful Terry stop.
Crowell's backpack cannot be the basis for individualized suspicion
because carrying a backpack is ordinary behavior. Officer Dixon based
his individualized suspicion of Crowell on the fact that his backpack was
heavy and contained cylindrical objects. 48 However, wearing a heavy,
bulky backpack is not unusual behavior, especially in the context of a
protest march. As the Ninth Circuit noted, wearing a backpack in general
is ordinary behavior. 149 At a protest march where food and services are
typically not available, people are even more likely to use a bag or
backpack to carry necessities such as food, water, and clothing.
Testimony from the district court proceedings in Graves indicates that
50
many of the protestors at the parade in fact carried some type of bag.
For example, Officer Dixon testified that he alone searched the bags of
approximately fourteen protestors in addition to Crowell. 5 1 Other

144.
145.
(1979).
146.
147.

See id. at 844.
See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-53
See Ybarra,444 U.S. at 90-91; Brown, 443 U.S. at 51-53.
See Graves, 339 F.3d at 834, 836.

148. Id. at 836.
149. See id. at 844.
150. See Brief for Appellant at 11, Graves (No. 02-35119).
151. Id.
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officers also actively searched protestors' bags,152 further indicating that
many of the people protesting at the parade carried bags. In addition,
while Crowell's backpack was heavy, there was nothing particularly
suspicious about Crowell's backpack as compared to other bags. 53 At
trial, Crowell demonstrated that a backpack identical to the one he was
wearing the day of the
parade, filled with identical objects, did not have
54
any unusual bulges.

Crowell's ordinary behavior of carrying a heavy backpack falls far
short of the level of individualized suspicion required by the U.S.
Supreme Court to establish the requisite degree of reasonable suspicion
for a lawful Terry stop. For example, in Reid v. Georgia, the Court held
that officers did not have sufficient individualized suspicion to perform a
Terry stop of the defendant based on the following factors: (1) traveling
from Ft. Lauderdale; (2) arriving early in the morning; (3) not checking
luggage; and (4) trying to avoid looking like he was traveling with a
companion.' 55 The Court concluded that many innocent travelers engage
in the behavior described in the first three factors, and thus these factors
were not enough for individualized suspicion of the defendant. 5 6 While
noting that the fourth factor may provide some level of individualized
suspicion of the defendant, the Court concluded that it was not enough to
support reasonable suspicion. 57 As in Reid, Officer Dixon's basis for
searching Crowell's backpack involved ordinary conduct that was likely
engaged in by a number of innocent people at the parade-simply
carrying a heavy, and perhaps bulky, backpack. 58 Therefore, this factor
cannot support individualized suspicion of Crowell. Even if the
heaviness or bulkiness of Crowell's backpack was out of the ordinary,
this alone was insufficient to establish individualized suspicion.
Carrying a heavy backpack is significantly less suspicious than trying to
conceal that one is traveling with a companion-the unusual behavior
that the Reid Court found insufficient to demonstrate individualized
suspicion. 159
152. Id. at 2.
153. See id. at 11.
154. Id.

155. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); see also supra notes 47-54 and accompanying
text.
156. Reid, 448 U.S. at 441.
157. Id.

158. Graves v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 836 (9th Cir. 2003).
159. Reid, 448 U.S. at 441.
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In addition, the level of suspicion that attached to Crowell's backpack
is much less compelling than the evidence the U.S. Supreme Court held
to be sufficient to establish individualized suspicion of an alleged drug
courier in United States v. Sokolow. In Sokolow, officers performed a
Terry stop of the defendant based on several factors that, although not
illegal, were highly unusual and would be unlikely to include many
innocent individuals. 60 These factors included paying for plane tickets
with $2100 in twenty-dollar bills and traveling under an alias. 16 1 In
contrast, Crowell's behavior of wearing a heavy backpack was entirely
ordinary conduct that was very likely to be engaged in by a number of
innocent individuals. Carrying a heavy backpack is significantly less
suspicious than paying for an expensive airplane ticket with lowdenomination bills and traveling under a false name. Thus, Officer
Dixon's individualized suspicion of Crowell was based on ordinary
behavior that would have implicated a number of innocent individuals.
The Ninth Circuit reached the correct conclusion when it held that
Officer Dixon had insufficient individualized suspicion of Crowell to
lawfully search his backpack. A lawful Terry stop requires that police
officers establish reasonable suspicion, 162 while a lawful search must be
based on the more exacting standard of probable cause. 163 Individualized
suspicion of a particular person is a requirement of both reasonable
suspicion 64 and probable cause. 165 Officer Dixon did not have enough
individualized suspicion of Crowell to establish the reasonable suspicion
predicate for a Terry stop. Therefore, he also had insufficient
individualized suspicion of Crowell to meet the more stringent predicate
of probable cause for a search.
B.

Officer Dixon Was Not Entitledto QualifiedImmunity Because
Crowell's Backpack DidNot Provide Sufficient Individualized
Suspicion To Establish ProbableCause

In Graves, the Ninth Circuit held that Officer Dixon was entitled to
qualified immunity for unlawfully arresting Crowell. The court
160. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3, 8-9 (1989); see also supra notes 62-64 and
accompanying text.
161. Id. at 8-9.
162. See id. at 7; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
163. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
164. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1979).
165. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 90-91.
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concluded that the law was not clearly established regarding how much
weight Officer Dixon could give to the surrounding circumstances of the
parade when making his determination of whether there was probable
cause to search Crowell's backpack. 66 The Graves court erred when it
held that Officer Dixon was entitled to qualified immunity because a
reasonable officer would have known that regardless of the surrounding
circumstances, individualized suspicion is necessary to make a
determination of probable cause. 67 Furthermore, a reasonable officer
would have been aware that, in the context of a Terry stop or a search,
individualized suspicion cannot be based on ordinary factors that would
implicate many innocent people, 68 such as carrying a heavy backpack.
Officer Dixon was not entitled to qualified immunity for performing a
Terry stop of Crowell because the law was clearly established that
individualized suspicion is a necessary prerequisite for a lawful Terry
stop and Officer Dixon did not have sufficient grounds for
individualized suspicion of Crowell. The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly
established that a Terry stop must be grounded on individualized
suspicion, regardless of the surrounding circumstances. 169 U.S. Supreme
Court and Ninth Circuit precedent have also clearly established that, in
the context of a Terry stop, individualized suspicion cannot be based on
ordinary factors that would implicate a number of innocent
individuals. 70 In Graves, Officer Dixon based his individualized
suspicion of Crowell on the fact that Crowell carried a heavy, bulky
backpack, 171 which is a factor that would implicate a large number of
innocent individuals. 172 He also relied on the hostile surrounding
circumstances of the parade in his assessment of reasonable suspicion. 173
Because the law was clearly established that police officers must have
individualized suspicion of a particular person to establish reasonable
suspicion,' 74 and that individualized suspicion cannot be based on

166. See Graves v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 847-48 (9th Cir. 2003).

167. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91.
168. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592,
595-96 (9th Cir. 1992).
169. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 51-53.
170. See Reid, 448 U.S. at 441; Rodriguez, 976 F.2d at 595-96.
171. See Graves, 339 F.3d at 836.
172. See supra Part IV.A.
173. See Graves, 339 F.3d at 836-37.
174. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 51-53.
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ordinary factors that would implicate many innocent people, 75 a
reasonable police officer should have known that Crowell's ordinary
behavior of carrying a backpack was insufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion of him. Although the surrounding circumstances of the parade
were hostile,' 76 and favored a finding of reasonable suspicion, the law
was clearly established that surrounding circumstances alone are not
enough to establish reasonable suspicion.177 Thus, a reasonable police
officer should have known that even under the circumstances of the
parade, there was not enough individualized suspicion of Crowell to
subject him to a Terry stop.
In addition, Officer Dixon was not entitled to qualified immunity for
unlawfully arresting Crowell because a reasonable officer would have
known that Crowell's ordinary behavior of carrying a backpack did not
provide enough individualized suspicion of him to establish probable
cause for a search. The law was clearly established that probable cause
must be based on individualized suspicion, even when the surrounding
circumstances weigh in favor of establishing probable cause. 178 Unlike
the Terry stop context, there is no case law holding that, in the context of
searches, individualized suspicion cannot be based on ordinary factors
that would implicate many innocent people. However, case law with the
same facts is not necessary for the law to be clearly established. 79 For
example, in Mendoza v. Block, the Ninth Circuit held that the law
regarding the use of excessive force was clearly established even though
there was little case law dealing specifically with the use of police dogs
to locate suspects because a reasonable officer would know that using a
"weapon," such as a police dog, would be unlawful in some
circumstances. 180 The Mendoza court concluded that the principle that
officers cannot use excessive force was clearly established even when
applied to a new situation.'18 Likewise, in Graves, a reasonable officer
would know that the principle that individualized suspicion for a Terry
stop cannot be based on factors that would include a number of innocent
individuals also applies to a similar situation-searches. Thus, because
175. See Reid, 448 U.S. at 441; Rodriguez, 976 F.2d at 595.
176. See Graves, 339 F.3d at 836-37.
177. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 51-53.
178. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
179. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357,
1362 (9th Cir. 1994).
180. Mendoza, 27 F.3d at 1362.
181. See id.
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individualized suspicion is a requirement that is common to, and
necessary for, both searches 182 and Terry stops,1 83 it would have been
apparent to a reasonable police officer from existing case law that
individualized suspicion cannot be based on factors that would implicate
a large number of innocent individuals in the context of a search or
Terry stop. Furthermore, because it was clearly established that the
predicate for a search requires a higher level of suspicion than the
predicate for a Terry stop,' 84 it would be apparent to a reasonable officer
that the standard for individualized suspicion could not be lower for a
search than for a Terry stop.
C.

To Protect Protestorsand Participantsat the Aryan Nations
Parade,the Coeur d'Alene Police Should Have SearchedBags
Pursuantto a Special Needs Program

If Coeur d'Alene police officers believed that suspicionless searches
were necessary to safeguard against people carrying bombs into the
parade, they should have employed a system of special needs searches to
detect bombs without violating the civil liberties of protestors. The U.S.
Supreme Court has established that suspicionless searches are allowable
as long as they are part of a special needs program.185 To be valid under
the Fourth Amendment, these programs must be based on special needs,
beyond normal law enforcement goals.1 86 Police officers must operate
the searches based on predetermined, objective criteria, and searches
cannot be grounded in suspicion of a particular individual or class of
individuals. 187
In Graves, the Coeur d'Alene Police Department had a valid goal,
beyond normal law enforcement needs, for conducting searches of
protestors at the parade-preventing violence. 188 However, the searches
conducted did not qualify under the special needs standard because they

182. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91.
183. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-53 (1979).
184. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31
(1968).
185. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
186. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1997); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1990).
187. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1990) (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375
(1987)).
188. See Graves v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 2003).
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were not based on predetermined, objective criteria. 189 In contrast to Sitz,
where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an organized random highway
screening program for alcohol intoxication,'9" the officers in Graves did
not determine which bags to search based on a previously established
plan.191
In the future, police officers should establish procedures to perform
special needs searches if they believe that suspicionless searches of
people's effects are necessary to maintain public safety at
demonstrations. By searching bags using a special needs program based
on uniform, predetermined criteria, police officers can enhance safety
without violating protestors' civil liberties.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Graves v. City of Coeur d'Alene, the Ninth Circuit held that there
was insufficient probable cause for the defendant police officer to search
and arrest a protestor at an Aryan Nations march. However, the court
invoked the doctrine of qualified immunity to protect the officer from
civil liability, finding that the law regarding probable cause as applied to
the facts of Graves was not clearly established. U.S. Supreme Court
precedent requires that police officers have individualized suspicion of
the suspect for a search to be lawful under the Fourth Amendment.
Because the police officer in Graves impermissibly searched the
protestor without sufficient individualized suspicion, in violation of
clearly established law, the police officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity. Concerns about national security cannot justify the
abandonment of the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches. When faced with similar circumstances, other circuit courts of
appeals should hold that police officers are not entitled to qualified
immunity.

189. See id. at 845 n.22.
190. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
191. See Graves, 339 F.3d at 845 n.22.

